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Introduction: Collision or Complementarity of Discourses? 
In the past few years there has been much impassioned debate about the compatibility of the 
WTO’s agenda and principles for trade liberalisation with international human rights norms. 
Some critics of the WTO have attacked both its general orientation to trade liberalisation and 
specific WTO rules as undermining human rights. Issues which have been said to demonstrate 
the conflict between trade liberalisation and basic human rights include restrictions placed by 
WTO rules on economic boycotts of countries on the grounds of violations of human rights 
standards, the impact on access to medicines of strong patent rights under the TRIPS 
agreement, and the effects of liberalisation commitments under the GATS on essential 
services such as water. 
At the same time, there have been significant initiatives and proposals, both political and 
academic, for a rapprochement of the free trade and human rights agendas. From the 
academic perspective the most fervent advocate of the complementarity of these two 
approaches is Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, who has for some years and in many repeated 
writings proposed a combination of trade and human rights from a social-market perspective 
based on ordo-liberal theory (e.g. Petersmann 1993, 1998, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004). 
This led to a memorably vehement clash with Philip Alston in the pages and on the website of 
the European Journal of International Law, in which Alston described Petersmann’s approach 
as an attempt to `hijack …  international human rights law in a way which would 
fundamentally redefine its contours’.2  
Institutional initiatives have come from the UN High Commissioner and Commission on 
Human Rights, which have produced a series of reports both on the general theme of the 
impact on human rights of globalisation and on the effects of specific aspects of the WTO 
agreements, notably of the agreements on agriculture, intellectual property (TRIPS), and 
services.3 Although these exercises seem to have been viewed initially with some suspicion 
                                                  
1 This paper is a first draft; please do not quote this version without first referring to the author; comments 
welcome to s.picciotto@lancs.ac.uk. 
2  Alston 2002, 816; for the full exchange see the European Journal of International Law’s Discussion Forum on 
Trade and Human Rights at http://www.ejil.org/forum_tradehumanrights/. 
3 See UN Commission on Human Rights 2000, 2004; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2001, 2002a, 
2002b, 2003, 2004a, 2004b.  
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and concern by the trade community, it seems that, as they have proceeded, some fruitful 
interchange of views has developed between the human rights and trade perspectives.4  
This paper will explore the implications of introducing human rights discourses and principles 
into the framework of economic regulation institutionalised in the WTO, around three aspects. 
First is the procedural and institutional question of the possible inclusion of human rights 
principles explicitly within the WTO framework. This leads on to the second and more 
substantive question of the relationship between the perspectives and discourses of trade and 
human rights and whether and how they could be reconciled. In conclusion, I will return to 
the institutional aspect by discussing the strategic aspects of the trade-human rights debates in 
the context of the role of the WTO as a node of global governance, and the critiques and 
challenges to it. 
A. LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE LEGITIMATION OF THE WTO 
The Rule of Law in the World Economy 
From the perspective of free trade advocates, the inclusion of human rights formally within 
the WTO system could help further to legitimate the WTO as an organisation. Already, the 
legitimacy of the WTO is seen to derive from law, demonstrated by the great stress placed on 
the WTO as embodying the Rule of Law in world trade, in public statements from the 
organisation. Thus, in a speech delivered shortly after the establishment of the WTO, its first 
Director-General Renato Ruggiero stated: 
That is why we need to keep the multilateral system, with its reliable framework of 
principles and rules in good repair; it is a firm foothold in a shifting world. 
Liberalisation within the multilateral system means that this unstoppable process can 
be implemented within internationally agreed rules and disciplines. This is the 
                                                  
4 The preliminary report submitted to the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights in June 2000 by J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama provoked a letter of complaint from the WTO 
to the High Commissioner for Human Rights in August 2000 (reported in Singh 2000). The objection was in 
particular to a reference to the WTO as a `nightmare’ for human rights, in the following context:  `WTO has 
been described as the “practical manifestation of globalisation in its trade and commercial aspects". A closer 
examination of the organisation will reveal that while trade and commerce are indeed its principle focus, the 
organisation has extended its purview to encompass additional areas beyond what could justifiably be described 
as within its mandate. Furthermore, even its purely trade and commerce activities have serious human rights 
implications. This is compounded by the fact that the founding instruments of WTO make scant (indeed only 
oblique) reference to the principles of human rights. The net result is that for certain sectors of humanity - 
particularly the developing countries of the South - the WTO is a veritable nightmare. The fact that women were 
largely excluded from the WTO decision-making structures, and that the rules evolved by WTO are largely 
gender-insensitive, means that women as a group stand to gain little from this organisation.’ (UN Commission 
on Human Rights 2000, para 15). This document was referred to in the WTO as the nightmare report (Marceau, 
2002); the term did not appear in subsequent reports. This may be compared with the report of the Mission to the 
WTO in July-August 2003 of the Special Rapporteur for the UN Commission on Human Rights on the right to 
health (UN Commission on Human Rights 2004, Addendum 1 to the Report), especially paras. 4-5, which refers 
in much more diplomatic terms to constructive, helpful and informative discussions. 
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opposite of a chaotic and unchecked process - without the security of the multilateral 
system, change would indeed be a leap in the dark. (Ruggiero 1995). 
Five years later, after the organisation was shaken by the debacle at Seattle, his successor 
Mike Moore delivering a speech on ` The Backlash against Globalisation?' concluded as 
follows: 
The WTO is a powerful force for good in the world. Yet we are too often 
misunderstood, sometimes genuinely, often wilfully. We are not a world government 
in any shape or form. People do not want a world government, and we do not aspire to 
be one. At the WTO, governments decide, not us. 
But people do want global rules. If the WTO did not exist, people would be crying out 
for a forum where governments could negotiate rules, ratified by national parliaments, 
that promote freer trade and provide a transparent and predictable framework for 
business. And they would be crying out for a mechanism that helps governments 
avoid coming to blows over trade disputes. That is what the WTO is. We do not lay 
down the law. We uphold the rule of law. The alternative is the law of the jungle, 
where might makes right and the little guy doesn't get a look in. (Moore 2000).  
The theme of the WTO as an institutionalisation of the rule of law in the world economy has 
been debated among academic commentators under the rubric of the `constitutionalisation' of 
international economic law. The term was applied to the GATT by the doyen of trade 
lawyers, John Jackson, who coined the term the `trade constitution' in the following terms: 
It is a very complex mix of economic and governmental policies, political constraints, 
and above all …  an intricate set of constraints imposed by a variety of "rules" or legal 
norms in a particular institutional setting. …  
This "constitution" imposes different levels of constraint on the policy options 
available to public or private leaders.5  
From a political perspective, Stephen Gill has attacked the `new constitutionalism’ 
represented not only by the WTO but other institutions of global governance as a `project of 
attempting to make transnational liberalism, and if possible liberal democratic capitalism, the 
sole model for future development' (Gill 2003, 132).  
Gill argues that the global constitutionalisation project is well under way, and headed in a 
clearly undesirable, neo-liberal direction. The recent study by Deborah Cass, however, 
suggests that it is inappropriate or premature to assume that the constitutionalisation of the 
WTO is a fait accompli (Cass 2005). Having identified six core elements of the accepted 
meaning of the term, she outlines three models or `visions’ of WTO constitutionalisation: 
                                                  
5 I cite this statement from the first edition of his text (Jackson 1989: 299), where the word `constitution' is put in 
inverted commas; the wording remained very similar in the second edition (1997), but the inverted commas had 
gone. 
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institutional managerialism, rights-based, and judicial norm-generation. The formal inclusion 
of human rights into the WTO could form part of the latter two models. This poses the 
additional question of whether, if the WTO were to evolve in a `constitutionalising’ manner, 
the inclusion of human rights in its core principles might ameliorate, or only enhance, the 
neo-liberal dominance denounced by Gill and others. The next two sections will consider the 
implications and prospects for inclusion of human rights within a project of WTO 
constitutionalisation, first via judicial norm-generation, and then in a more formal rights-
based system. 
Judicial Constitutionalisation: WTO Rules OK? 
Constitutional norms could emerge through the potential role of the WTO’s Appellate Body 
(AB), as the apex of its dispute settlement system (DSS), in developing the jurisprudence of 
the WTO. This would follow the trail blazed by the European Court of Justice, which Joe 
Weiler has convincingly argued played a transformative role by developing doctrines such as 
supremacy and direct effect of European law, to help reconfigure the European Communities 
as more than merely international organisations. There are nevertheless clear limitations on 
the role a judicial body can play in this respect. This has been clearly demonstrated by the 
EU’s failure to create the political basis for any kind of `constitution’, leaving it in the 
institutional limbo of `multi-level governance’. These limitations are even more clear for the 
AB, which has been kept on a very tight leash by the WTO’s member states, as well as 
lacking the channels for networking with national judiciaries which have been an important 
element of the ECJ’s relative success (Helfer & Slaughter 1997). Although the AB is indeed 
an international economic court in all but name (Weiler 2001), and has been gradually 
developing a coherent body of jurisprudence, it has done so under the cloak of a strict 
formalism (Picciotto 2005). It is clearly mindful that under the WTO agreements its role is `to 
provide security and predictability to the multilateral trading system' by clarifying the rules, 
and that only the WTO's political bodies are empowered to provide interpretations of them.6 
Nevertheless, the basis exists for the AB to seek to enhance both its own and the WTO’s 
legitimacy by incorporation of human rights norms. As Pauwelyn points out, although it may 
have come as a surprise to some trade negotiators, general rules of international law 
necessarily apply to the relations between WTO member states, and the WTO agreements 
form part of that general body of law and must be accommodated to it in some way 
(Pauwelyn 2001). Indeed, the AB has often stressed that the reference to clarification of the 
WTO agreements `in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law’ requires it to apply the principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
                                                  
6 Formally, the AB’s decisions take the form of Reports to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), although these 
are automatically adopted unless there is a consensus decision to reject. Art. 3.2 of the DSU firmly states that the 
role of the dispute settlement system is `to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot 
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements', while the WTO Agreement 
itself (art. IX.2) specifies that `The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive 
authority to adopt interpretations …  of the …  Agreements', which requires a 75% majority of states; art.X 
provides for the adoption of amendments.  
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Treaties, which include `any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties’ as relevant context for treaty interpretation. Since many human rights 
principles are recognised as obligations erga omnes in general international law, and WTO 
member states are all parties to the UN Charter as well as in many cases other specific human 
rights conventions, the legal route lies open for the AB to assert that WTO obligations should 
be interpreted in line with obligations under international law, including human rights 
principles.  
Yet there has been a marked reluctance to do so, not only on the part of the AB but also 
(indeed perhaps more so) of WTO diplomats and officials.7 In any case, a claim under the 
dispute settlement procedure must allege a breach of WTO rules, and other rules can only be 
applied if they are invoked by the defendant state. Hence, the fact that no state has yet 
invoked human rights obligations in a dispute under the WTO (or for that matter the GATT), 
has been said to demonstrate that there is no incompatibility (Lim 2001, 284).  
Even when non-WTO rules applicable between the parties are invoked, there is considerable 
scope for an adjudicator to decide whether to adopt a bold or cautious approach to the general 
question of the relationship between WTO rules and other international law obligations. 
Generally, from the side of the WTO, the preference has been for caution. First, the issue can 
be construed narrowly so as to confine it to WTO rules. This fits well within the AB’s 
emphasis on the principle of `judicial economy’, or avoiding pronouncing on issues which are 
not necessary to resolve the specific complaint before it. In particular, consideration of non-
WTO rules can be avoided unless they are clearly in conflict with WTO obligations. A key 
tactic then is to adopt a strict approach which assumes that rules are compatible unless it is 
impossible to comply with both. This has been the view of the AB, which has defined a 
conflict as `a situation where adherence to one provision will lead to a violation of the other 
provision’.8  
Legal indeterminacy leaves much room to interpret rules so as to find them compatible. Thus, 
the AB has rejected arguments by the EU that the WTO rules on food safety should be 
interpreted in the light of the `precautionary principle’, by taking the view that (i) opinions 
differ as to whether this principle is accepted as binding in international law, (ii) that it would 
therefore be `unnecessary, and probably imprudent …  to take a position on this important, but 
abstract, question’, and that in any case (iii) the principle is reflected in WTO rules, notably 
articles of the SPS Agreement.9 Finally, even if a conflict were to be found, there is 
                                                  
7 WTO staff members have published academic articles on the subject (notably Lim 2001, Marceau 2002), 
although of course stressing that the views expressed are strictly their own and do not bind either the WTO 
secretariat or its member states. It is nevertheless interesting to note that one article by a member of the External 
Affairs division (Lim 2001) appeared a year or so after the WTO’s sharp response to the UN High 
Commissioner over the `nightmare report’. 
8 Guatemala - Cement 1998, para. 65, cited by Pauwelyn (2001, 551), who points out that this approach means 
that a state may be unable to exercise a right created under international law subsequent to the WTO agreements.  
9 See EC Hormones (1998) para 123. Not surprisingly, the Panel in the recent report in EC Biotech Products 
followed this view (para. 7.89; the report is not yet officially released, but available on the FoE website).  
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considerable rule for debate on how it should be resolved under the various accepted treaty 
interpretation principles. In particular, the principle generalia specialibus non derogat (a 
general rule cannot override a more specific one) is likely to lead to the view that WTO trade 
rules cannot be overridden by general human rights obligations (unless, of course, the latter 
are considered jus cogens). Indeed, even authors who consider that the AB should apply non-
WTO rules where relevant tend to accept that in case of a conflict the WTO rules should 
prevail (Bartels 2001).10   
The general approach has been to stress the strictly limited function of WTO’s dispute 
settlement system, to the point where it is said to be a lex specialis, or a self-contained legal 
system (Marceau 2002, 32ff). It is nevertheless conceded that `if the WTO system is self-
contained, it is not entirely self-contained' (Palmeter & Mavroidis 1998, 413), in that WTO 
rules may themselves refer to or incorporate other international law rules (Trachtman 1999, 
343). This is most notoriously the case for the TRIPS agreement, which incorporates (and 
therefore makes binding on all WTO members) the major provisions of key intellectual 
property conventions administered by WIPO. Slightly more indirectly, the SPS and TBT 
agreements create an obligation for WTO member states to use standards developed by 
relevant international organisations where they exist.11 Such provisions in effect make the 
WTO’s DSS an enforcement body also for these other areas of international law.12 
Hence, the `partly self-contained’ view of the WTO means that it is a matter for each state to 
ensure compatibility of WTO rules with international obligations, such as human rights 
norms, which are not specifically incorporated into the WTO agreements. `States, members of 
the WTO, remain fully bound and responsible for any violation of their international law 
obligations but they cannot use the WTO remedial machinery to enforce them.' (Marceau 
2002, 34). Furthermore, the WTO is considered to be no more than a forum for states, with no 
executive powers, unlike the IMF and World Bank, so that neither the organisation itself nor 
its secretariat can have any direct obligations to ensure compatibility of its work with human 
rights obligations (Lim 2001, 280).  
Although this approach suggests a modest role for WTO rules and their enforcement, the 
effect is in fact quite the opposite one of reinforcing their power. The WTO is exceptional, 
indeed unique, among international organisations as regards the range and effectiveness of its 
                                                  
10 Bartels bases this on treating articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU as a `conflicts’ rule, since they specify that DSS 
decisions cannot add to or diminish rights or obligations of WTO members, Panels and the AB must apply the 
WTO rule in case of a conflict. Marceau does not agree with this reasoning but comes to the same conclusion. 
Pauwelyn (in my view rightly) says that these provisions actually aim at reining in the DSS from expansive or 
adventurous interpretations of WTO trade rules, but provides only a very egregious example of a situation in 
which a Panel might be obliged to find a WTO rule invalid, viz. if the WTO were to conclude a slave trading 
agreement  (564). 
11 TBT art. 2(4), and SPS art. 3(1).  
12 Thus the AB has ruled on whether food labelling regulations complied with a Codex standard (EC Sardines 
2002), and a Panel has ruled on the validity of copyright exceptions under the `three-step test’ of the Berne 
Copyright Convention (US - Copyright Act 2000). 
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compliance mechanisms. Most prominent is the DSS, which provides independent 
adjudication providing a complainant with a guarantee of a decision within a relatively short 
timescale, and the possibility of applying what amount to trade sanctions if the decision is not 
complied with. Less visible, but also effective, are the more extensive procedural 
arrangements for supervision of member state compliance through the range of WTO 
committees. In contrast, the compliance mechanisms of international human rights 
instruments must be described as weak. They rely mainly on self-reporting by states and 
scrutiny by committees of experts. Some (notably the ICCPR) also provide options for states 
to allow complaints by other states, as well as individual petitions, and other mechanisms 
such as fact-finding missions have also been developed. Crucially, however, compliance 
depends on `naming and shaming’, and lacks the harder economic impact of the WTO’s 
ultimate weapon of withdrawal of trade advantages. Hence the potential attractions of a more 
formalised inclusion of human rights principles within the WTO framework. 
Formalising a Rights-Based Constitution? 
In the face of such a broad consensus for maintaining a distance between the WTO and 
human rights norms, one has a certain admiration for the iconoclasm of Petersmann in 
persisting with his proposals. They can certainly be said to have merit in resolving some of 
the uncertainties and difficulties of the present situation of a `not entirely self-contained’ 
WTO legal system. In particular, the explicit inclusion of human rights principles within the 
WTO would overcome the problem that judicialisation would face, that adjudicators would 
have to apply only universally applicable human rights norms, or else generate non-uniform 
interpretations of WTO rules dependent on which human rights obligations are applicable 
between the parties to a particular dispute.13 As Petersmann points out, this is especially 
problematic as over 30 WTO members, including the USA, are not parties to the 1966 UN 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (2004, 607).  
Hence, Petersmann’s project is to effectuate a substantive rapprochement between traditional 
human rights norms and the economic rights and liberties that he sees as central to the WTO: 
`Just as UN human rights conventions do not refer to international division of labour, 
“market freedoms”, and property rights as essential conditions for creating the 
economic resources needed for the enjoyment of human rights,14 so WTO law does 
not explicitly refer to respect and protection of human rights as necessary means for 
realizing the WTO objectives of “raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
                                                  
13 Pauwelyn opts for the latter, conceding that it `may complicate the matrix of rights and obligations between 
WTO members. But this is an unavoidable consequence of not having a centralised legislator in international 
law.’ (Pauwelyn 2001, 567).  
14 `It is only in the context of the right to work (Article 6) that the ICESCR of 1966 refers to the need for 
government policies promoting “development and full and productive employment under conditions 
safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual” (Article 6.2).’ [Footnote in the 
original.] 
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demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services” (WTO 
Preamble).’ (Petersmann 2004, 607-8). 
This clearly raises the question of which economic human rights should be recognised by the 
WTO, and in what form.  
Of course, human rights, as they have developed historically, have been most strongly 
articulated in the `first generation' civil and political rights, while the `second generation' 
economic, social and cultural rights are often considered to be aspirations at best; and `third 
generation' collective rights such as self-determination and sustainable development are hard 
to operationalise as enforceable rights. Alston, in his critique of Petersmann, distinguishes 
between the `instrumental’ nature of the guarantees of economic liberties recognised by the 
WTO and the fuller `political’ character of rights as seen from the human rights perspective: 
`any such rights arising out of WTO agreements are not, and should not be considered 
to be, analogous to human rights. Their purpose is fundamentally different. Human 
rights are recognised for all on the basis of the inherent human dignity of all persons. 
Trade-related rights are granted to individuals for instrumentalist reasons. Individuals 
are seen as objects rather than as holders of rights. They are empowered as economic 
agents for particular purposes and in order to promote a specific approach to economic 
policy, but not as political actors in the full sense and nor as the holders of a 
comprehensive and balanced set of individual rights. There is nothing per se wrong 
with such instrumentalism but it should not be confused with a human rights 
approach.' (Alston 2002, xx). 
This seems linked to Alston’s next point, which doubts whether Petersmann properly includes 
in his schema `social’ rights such as the rights to education, health care and food, which are 
certainly rejected by fundamentalist liberal theorists of whom Petersmann approves, such as 
Hayek.  
Yet education, health, food, and shelter are very much economic matters. I suggest that the 
distinction is not so much between `social’ and `economic’ rights, as between individual 
rights and socio-economic policies. The emphasis on individual rights in liberalism aims to 
protect individual freedoms from the potentially autocratic power of the state. Hence, the 
traditional human rights were civil and political rights. Their extension to individual 
economic rights would entrench liberal economic principles which assume that the pursuit of 
individual self-interest, especially through economic exchange, is ultimately beneficial to all. 
This would limit and constrain collective action or regulation through the state or public 
bodies. In contrast, second and third generation human rights are cast more as obligations on 
the state, to develop economic policies that achieve certain social objectives.  
Indeed, neo-liberal constitutionalism aims to entrench internationally-agreed principles to 
secure the 'effective judicial protection of the transnational exercise of individual rights' 
(Petersmann 1998, 26). It would enshrine economic rights such as the `freedom to trade' as 
fundamental rights of individuals, legally enforceable through national constitutions in 
national courts (Petersmann 1993). While accepting that freedom of trade should also be 
accompanied by other human rights, which should all be enshrined in the WTO `constitution', 
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Petersmann’s emphasis is on rights of private property and market freedoms. He points out 
that the right to property recognised in classic human rights instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 is complemented by the protection of 
intellectual property rights in the TRIPS agreement (Petersmann 2000, 21). However, he goes 
further and argues that liberal traders should welcome the inclusions of human rights 
protecting individual freedom, non-discrimination and equal opportunities, and that the 
mercantilist bias of WTO in favour of producers could be corrected by the protection of 
competition and of the rights of `the general consumer and citizen interest in liberal trade and 
…  human rights' (Petersmann 2000, 22). 
The stress is on equality of rights, which appears to protect the weak. However, it 
conveniently overlooks the realities of inequalities of power. In practice, the rights which 
would be most firmly entrenched are the market-access and private-property rights, which 
mainly benefit large firms, and transnational rights would benefit TNCs. The traditional civil 
and political rights were conceived as the rights of human beings, hence `human’ rights. Even 
economic rights when cast as human rights are seen as personal individual rights, hence the 
right to property finds broad acceptability as a right to personal property. However, economic 
development has resulted in ever more complex forms of institutionalisation of socio-
economic activity. Yet from the perspective of liberal capitalism, these are viewed in terms of 
`private’ property rights. This generates all sorts of fantastical and fictitious forms of 
`intangible’ property rights, from shares in a company to today’s complex financial 
derivatives, and the contradictory concept of intellectual property rights. All these rights of 
`investors’ would come to be protected under the concept of the human right to the protection 
of property. Then, to cap it all corporations, as fictitious `legal persons’, are also recognised 
as bearers of human rights.  
The effect of institutionalisation of the WTO is to constrain national policy choices by 
embedding broad and stringent international obligations to liberalise international economic 
flows. WTO enthusiasts argue that this is necessary since national state regulation tends to be 
protectionist because it is the product of the `capture' of states by special interests. For 
example: 
`Free trade and democratic government face a common obstacle - the influence of 
concentrated interest groups. …  The WTO and the trade agreements it administers act 
to restrain protectionist interest groups, thereby promoting free trade and democracy.' 
(McGinnis and Movesian 2000: 515). 
The anti-democratic implications of this view are justified by its roots in a particular concept 
of liberal democracy, in which state power must be confined, in order to safeguard individual 
rights and liberties. This would be further reinforced by the `strong’ neo-liberal vision of 
constitutionalisation of the WTO, put forward especially by Petersmann. Giving individuals, 
including `investors’ and corporations, rights which they could enforce directly, in national 
courts or through the WTO’s DSS or both, would further constrain the possibilities of 
collective action through the state or public bodies, and operate to exacerbate economic 
inequalities by handing a powerful weapon to those whose economic power can be defended 
in terms of economic rights. 
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Other forms of recognition of human rights within the WTO could, of course, be envisaged. 
Most easily compatible with the original structure of the GATT as a type of `embedded 
liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982) would be to allow exceptions from trade liberalisation obligations 
in favour of actions to protect and promote human rights. This approach has been most 
thoroughly explored in the debate about the linkage between trade and labour rights (Leary in 
Bhagwati & Hudec 1996, Hepple 2001). It has of course been strongly criticised from the 
viewpoint of developing countries as a protectionist move by the rich (TWIN-SAL 1999). 
Some of the arguments have largely echoed trade liberalisation perspectives, by suggesting 
that the comparative advantage of countries with low labour costs should not be undermined. 
From the human rights perspective the issue is not comparative wage rates, but violations of 
rights such as freedom of association and free collective bargaining. A more cogent criticism 
is that the GATT approach of allowing exceptions for types of state action recognised as 
being in the public interest15 would legitimate unilateral state action, and allow selective 
targeting. Inevitably, of course, such action is generally taken by economically powerful 
states, wishing to deny or control access to their markets to economically weaker states, 
sometimes using human rights violations as a pretext. Accusations of human rights violations 
have been used to justify trade and economic boycotts in the US actions against Myanmar and 
Cuba (McCrudden 1999), which might have been found in violation of WTO rules had not an 
accommodation been reached. Other methods which have been considered which might help 
reinforce international labour standards by strengthening the role of the ILO through a linkage 
with the WTO (ILO 1994, Charnovitz 1995) have not been pursued, largely due to the 
strength of feeling about comparative advantage. 
Human rights could be recognised within the WTO in ways which might maintain the view of 
them as requiring the pursuit of socio-economic policies to achieve universal basic economic 
standards, simply by adding them as aims of the organisation. The WTO Agreement currently 
expresses its broad aims as follows: 
`relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a 
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production 
of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to 
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a 
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of 
economic development… ’ 
Although there is some recognition of social objectives, such as the pursuit of full 
employment and sustainable development, the statement does reflect the neo-classical 
economic assumptions underpinning trade liberalisation, generally that `a rising tide lifts all 
boats’. Inclusion of the achievement of basic socio-economic human rights such as food, 
water, shelter, health and education could inject concerns to ensure that policies should aim to 
achieve basic economic standards for all, rather than assuming that overall economic growth 
                                                  
15 In the GATT this is done in the Exceptions in article XX.  
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will automatically `trickle down’. Thus, such a move might create space to debate the 
directions of trade and economic policies, going beyond the assumptions underpinning 
liberalisation. The next section will explore how far human rights perspectives and discourses 
would help open up such alternative perspectives. 
B. DEBATING RIGHTS 
Three perspectives may be discerned on the relationship between human rights norms and 
economic liberalisation. For some there is a fundamental conflict: `neoliberal globalisation is 
incompatible with the globalisation of human rights’ (George 1999, 15). Others consider that 
human rights, understood as liberal rights protecting both economic and political freedom of 
individuals, would complement and even reinforce the WTO’s free trade mission, as shown 
above in the discussion of constitutionalisation. A middle view argues that although the two 
have developed in isolation, they have much in common and are converging: human rights are 
not confined to restricting the state but also prescribe positive state action, but equally trade 
regulation cannot aim only at negative integration but must provide a basis to balance the 
costs of liberalisation and make them socially acceptable; hence, it could be helpful to 
develop debate between the two perspectives (Cottier 2002). This section will explore these 
viewpoints in relation to a couple of specific examples. 
Access to Medicines 
One much-debated issue has been the impact of the strong patent rights required by the 
TRIPS agreement on access to medicines. This of course is not just a trade matter, and trade 
purists as well as critics of the WTO have attacked the inclusion of intellectual property 
protection, which has greatly expanded the scope of the WTO. The effect of the TRIPS 
agreement was not only to oblige all WTO member states to comply with the basic provisions 
of the key IP treaties, but also to establish a uniform minimum level of protection, going well 
beyond existing treaties. In particular, art. 27 TRIPS required that patents be made available 
`for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology’. At one stroke 
this deprived states of a policy option which many, especially developing countries, had 
previously chosen, by requiring patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs (subject to the 
transition periods allowed for developing and least developed countries). Unless the 
`flexibilities’ for which developing countries had pressed in the TRIPS could be exploited, 
those countries which had succeeded in establishing a thriving and competitive generic 
industry producing low-cost essential drugs might be obliged to shift towards R&D-based 
production, while others which had not yet managed to stimulate low-cost drugs production 
would have that policy option restricted.  
The desirability of patent protection for pharmaceuticals has long been debated both 
nationally and internationally, as indeed have the broader questions of whether and how far IP 
protections should be granted to stimulate innovation and creativity. The older IP treaties, 
especially the Paris Industrial Property Convention of 1883, had left states considerable 
leeway in deciding what the extent and level of protection should be, as well as exceptions 
which could be provided, in particular through compulsory licensing. In the battle over 
negotiation of the TRIPS in the Uruguay Round some of these exceptions were preserved, 
although with some significant modifications, notably in TRIPS articles 30 and 31. The 
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TRIPS agreement also included two general articles (7 and 8) with broad statements of 
Objectives and Principles In particular, article 8 provides:  
`Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement.’  
A number of human rights impinge on this issue. What is striking however is that such 
arguments could be made both for and against patent protection for drugs. The UDHR art. 27 
states that `Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author’. This is 
expressed in similar terms in ICESCR article 15, but it is balanced by the right of everyone to 
`enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications’. This need to balance the private 
right of appropriation with the public interests in diffusion is also central to intellectual 
property laws (UNHCHR 2001, 5). Thus, human rights may be used as a basis for claiming 
intellectual property protection, as well as for restricting it. 
This is well illustrated by the constitutional challenge brought by pharmaceutical firms 
against South Africa's medicines laws in 1998. Strikingly, this case was based on claims of 
human rights violations, especially the deprivation of property without compensation.16 This 
case raised echoes of the successful constitutional challenge brought by pharmaceutical 
companies in Italy in 1978, on the grounds that the exclusion of medicines from patent 
protection was unfairly discriminatory, which dealt a mortal blow to the once-flourishing 
Italian generic drug manufacturing industry.17 Certainly, strong counter-arguments could be 
made,18 especially since the South African constitution is in some respects post-liberal, and 
recognises rights to housing (article 26), as well as health care, food, water and social security 
(article 27). These provisions place an obligation on the government to take `reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights'. Few other constitutions provide such a basis to balance 
vested property rights against the rights of the dispossessed. However, the collapse of the case 
was due to the global attention attracted by the access to medicines campaign, which was able 
to build international support around the issue of HIV-AIDS, and gave a new impetus to the 
political debates around the TRIPS agreement (Drahos and Mayne 2002, 248-250). In the 
                                                  
16 See Notice of Motion in the High Court of South Africa, Case number: 4183/98 , 42 applicants, against the 
Government of South Africa (10 respondents). Article 25 of the constitution prohibits the taking of property 
except in terms of a law of general application, for a public purpose and with the provision of compensation. 
17 Grubb 1999, 67; according to one study, the effects of the extension of patenting to pharmaceuticals in Italy 
were an increased propensity to patent, but no increase in R&D (Scherer 1995). 
18 For example, as formulated in the Amicus Curiae brief by the Treatment Action Campaign, available from 
http://www/tac/org/za, accessed 10th June 2001. 
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absence of this political debate, the South African courts might easily have upheld the 
pharmaceutical companies' rights to their patents.19  
Certainly, activist bodies such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), have successfully 
integrated legal strategies into their broader campaigns,20 but these have necessarily entailed 
detailed and complex economic arguments about drug pricing in segmented markets with 
public procurement. Although the political impact of the campaign has been very important, 
especially due to the global awareness of the AIDS issue, it is doubtful that the invocation of 
human rights discourses has had more than a marginal effect. The same can be said of the 
global campaign that resulted in the compromise in the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and its subsequent implementation by WTO Council 
Decisions.21 Although this was portrayed as a victory for developing countries, it is a modest 
modification establishing a cumbersome procedure, which states show little signs of utilising.  
There are a number of ways in which greater flexibility could be introduced into the TRIPS 
agreement to permit and encourage states to remodel their intellectual property protection to 
favour the diffusion of innovations in the public interest. The provision in TRIPS article 8 
permitting states to `adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition’ could 
perhaps be strengthened by adding more explicit and detailed references to human rights to 
health. Of greater importance would be the removal of the proviso `that such measures 
[should be] consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.’ This could also be achieved if 
human rights obligations were accepted as overriding the more specific provisions of the 
TRIPS agreement. However, this would be highly controversial and strongly resisted.  
                                                  
19 Thus it is hard to understand Petersmann's assertion that the withdrawal of the pharmaceutical companies' 
claim `demonstrated the importance of civil society support and of judicial remedies for reconciling national and 
international economic law …  with social human rights' (Petersmann 2002a). His suggestion that the withdrawal 
by the USA of its WTO complaint against Brazil's local working requirement for patents also demonstrates the 
responsiveness of WTO procedures to social human rights concerns (ibid., footnote 70) is equally fanciful. It 
was the civil society campaign around access to medicines that persuaded the companies to withdraw their legal 
claims based on their human rights, and made the US challenge against Brazil politically inopportune. 
20 For an account and evaluation of the Medicines Act case see Heywood 2001; TAC and a number of other 
NGOs subsequently also brought a case against the Minister of Health to make the antiretroviral drug nevirapine 
available in the public health sector, which resulted in a thoughtful opinion by the South African constitutional 
court focusing on the extent of the state’s obligation to take `reasonable measures’ to achieve socio-economic 
rights (such as health) provided for in the constitution, while stressing that `in dealing with such matters the 
courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and political enquiries necessary for 
determining what the minimum-core standards …  should be, nor for deciding how public revenues should most 
effectively be spent’ (para. 37). It nevertheless did grant an order that the government should devise and 
implement a programme to combat mother-to-child HIV transmission, although `within its available resources’, 
and to allow doctors to prescribe nevirapine when they considered it medically indicated. [Also Competition 
Commission reference]. 
 
21 A General Council Decision of 6 December 2005 agreed a Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement 
(WT/L/641 8 December 2005), formally enacting the previous decision of 30 August 2003 on the 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. This is the 
first time a core WTO agreement has been amended. 
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Food 
Central to the trajectory of the WTO, and the crucial element in the current Doha 
`development’ round of trade negotiations, is agriculture. This is both the key sector for most 
developing countries and a vital one for the well-being of the world’s poor. It is a concern 
from the human rights perspective in relation to the right to food and the right to 
development. Consequently it was selected for examination by the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights in response to the call from the Human Rights Commission for a report on 
`Globalisation and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’ (UN HCHR 2002). This 
examined the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), which provides the framework for 
the WTO’s approach to liberalisation of this sector.  
The Report accepts that  
`Increased levels of trade in agriculture can contribute to the enjoyment of the right to 
food by augmenting domestic supplies of food to meet consumption needs and by 
optimizing the use of world resources. Similarly, on account of the AoA, international 
trade in agriculture is now subject to rules, which promotes transparency and 
accountability - important prerequisites for the enjoyment of human rights’ (ibid., 13). 
However, it stresses that: 
`Human rights law concerns itself in particular with the situation of the individuals 
and groups who might suffer during the reform process.  Indeed, this is one of the key 
issues concerning globalisation and human rights.  Even where the net social benefit 
from trade liberalisation favours the majority in a certain country, the principle of non-
discrimination under human rights law requires immediate action to protect the human 
rights of those who do not benefit.  In the case of the AoA, this means that States 
should use existing flexibilities in the Agreement where they exist, and WTO 
members should consider improving or adding flexibilities where appropriate.’ 
Areas in which it suggests such flexibilities should be considered include permitting 
protection `where trade liberalisation affects the availability, accessibility or sustainability of 
food supplies’, and measures to deal with the vulnerability of primary producing countries to 
price fluctuations and consequently balance of payments problems. It also made an interesting 
distinction between the perspectives towards the principle of non-discrimination of trade law 
and human rights law. 
`“National treatment” envisages equal treatment for nationals and non-nationals - 
whether they are poor farmers or large agrobusiness or industrial firms.  Treating 
unequals as equals is problematic for the promotion and protection of human rights 
and could result in the institutionalisation of discrimination against the poor and 
marginalised.  Under human rights law, the principle of non-discrimination does not 
envisage according equal treatment to everyone in all cases. Affirmative action is 
necessary in some cases to protect vulnerable people and groups.’ 
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But here again it concedes that trade law has made some recognition of this, in the principle 
of `special and differential treatment’, which is of long-standing in the GATT and WTO, and 
has been reaffirmed in the Doha Declaration as the basis of the current trade round. 
The issues in the agriculture negotiations centre on the phasing out of subsidies in rich 
countries, and the extent to which other forms of farm support, which in principle are non-
price-related, should be acceptable. While there is certainly evidence that trade liberalisation 
has affected food supplies and security in many developing countries, they often do not result 
from WTO commitments, but from the more rapid pace of liberalisation required as a 
condition of support especially by the IMF.22 An alternative vision of how agriculture could 
be regulated to safeguard human rights to food, based on food sovereignty, has been put 
forward by a coalition of NGOs (Coordination Sud 2005). Although they do represent a very 
cogent view of how agricultural trade should be managed, it is not the only one which would 
be compatible with the right to food. It strength is not its reference to human rights principles, 
but its articulation of detailed policy proposals based on the perspectives of small farmers and 
conscientious consumers. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
It seems hard to sustain the view that there is a fundamental conflict between human rights 
norms and principles of economic liberalisation as reflected in the WTO. Human rights had 
their origins in the liberal impulse of the Enlightenment, to expand the realm of individual 
freedoms against the autocratic state. However, the guarantee and protection of individual 
freedom in the economic sphere tends to exacerbate social inequalities, and could undermine 
collective action through public bodies and states. Recognising this, ideas and principles of 
human rights have undergone considerable development in the past half-century. Their 
formulation has evolved to a considerable extent towards articulating the protection of 
individuals within a perspective of social, cultural and economic rights, expressed as policy 
obligations on states. However, human rights norms are still open to alternative, competing, 
and conflicting interpretations. Issues which would be central to a meaningful debate about 
their application to economic regulation remain open, such as whether their subjects are 
individuals or social groups, human beings or legal persons (including corporations).  
Trade rules are a combination of broad principles and more detailed regulation.23 Many of the 
general principles are couched in universalistic terms which appear to have much in common 
with basic human rights principles, notably non-discrimination. In addition, the WTO 
agreements include some general principles recognising the need to take account of the social 
impact of economic liberalisation, notably `special and differential treatment’ for developing 
countries, and the public interest objectives in the TRIPS, mentioned above. However, the 
general principles are usually expressed in such a way that they cannot be used to override the 
more specific provisions, except when formulated as exceptions permitting national state 
                                                  
22 E.g. Ghana poultry imports [amplify]. 
23 The WTO itself comprises a complex package of agreements consisting of some 26,000 pages, undoubtedly 
the most extensive international convention ever negotiated. 
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action. However, the strength of the WTO system depends on limiting and constraining such 
exceptions, since experience shows that they can be abused especially by the more powerful 
states, leading to a fragmentation of the trading regime. 
Greater interaction between the trade and human rights viewpoints could have a variety of 
effects. One might be the (re)assimilation of human rights into the neo-liberal perspective of 
individual freedoms. As we have seen, that is the thrust of Petersmann’s proposals for the 
integration of human rights into a `constitutionalised’ WTO. At the opposite pole, human 
rights discourses could be counterposed to the liberalisation principles of the WTO, to 
challenge its underlying assumptions, and help provide a basis for radical alternative policies. 
A middle outcome might be that the introduction of human rights concerns might help temper 
the negative effects of liberalisation by encouraging measures aimed at achieving basic 
standards of socio-economic provision. 
The outcomes of such interactions would also depend on the institutional form it takes. As 
shown by the analysis in the first section of this paper, the dominant view of the WTO’s rule-
based system is that it is and should remain largely self-contained from other areas of 
international law, including human rights. Paradoxically, however, this reinforces the power 
of the WTO as a node of global regulatory networks (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, Picciotto 
1997). On the other hand, inclusion of human rights norms within the WTO system might 
serve to strengthen the WTO’s institutional legitimacy. 
In my view a major problem with current debates about global economic governance is the 
wide gap between the clash of rhetoric and the cogency and constructiveness of detailed 
policy proposals and arguments. I suggest that debates about economic liberalisation and 
human rights would simply turn up the rhetorical decibel level, and contribute little to the 
much-needed democratisation of debates about global economic governance. 
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